ABSTRACT: In this paper, the author documents the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' ''special relationship'' with the Financial Accounting Foundation and the Financial Accounting Standards Board, tending to suggest that these latter two bodies may not have exhibited independence, at least in appearance, from the Institute and from the practicing profession during the years from 1972 to 1980.
principles'' was the following: ''Members of the Board, who continue as members of their firms, cannot, it is said, be truly independent, since their views are likely to be colored by the interests of important clients in relation to matters brought before the Board. This points to the need of a full-time Board, free from any other allegiances'' (Committee on Establishment of an Accounting Commission 1971, 609, 611, 612) . 1 In 1970, the heads of three of the Big 8 audit firms, in an extraordinary move, wrote letters to the Institute, saying that they no longer had confidence in the APB (Zeff 2016a, 137) . Wallace E. Olson, a partner in a non-Big 8 audit firm who was one of the seven members of the Wheat Study (and who became the Institute's full-time chief executive in 1974), subsequently wrote that ''it was clear [from the evidence gathered by the Wheat Study] that non-CPAs viewed the APB as a captive of the public accounting profession, and they suspected board members as being unduly influenced by the makeup of their firms' clienteles'' (Olson 1982, 67) . In its report, the Wheat Study (AICPA 1972, 8) concluded that ''[a] part-time, volunteer APB will continue to be subject to doubts as to the disinterestedness of its members-their freedom from client and other pressures.''
THE WHEAT STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS
Following extensive data-gathering, which included a public hearing, the Wheat Study rendered its report in March 1972 , in which it boldly recommended the establishment of the FASB as a full-time accounting standard setter (the first in the world), under the aegis of the newly created FAF, and not as a unit within the AICPA. The Wheat Study argued that the ''major positive arguments for a full-time board are independence and efficiency. It is the doubts cast on the disinterestedness of a part-time board which trouble its critics the most'' (AICPA 1972, 61) . It added that the FAF should be ''separate from all existing professional bodies'' (AICPA 1972, 69 ). Yet the members of the Wheat Study believed that, in order to secure the obligatory AICPA endorsement of its recommendations, concessions in terms of influence, and even control, over making the appointments would have to be made to the Institute to enable it to continue to play an important role in the standard-setting process. The Wheat Study said that it is ''important to preserve the self-regulatory character of the standard-setting process through an organizational interlock between the new Foundation and the AICPA'' (AICPA 1972, 84) . Therefore, the Wheat Study recommended that the Institute's Board of Directors be authorized to appoint eight of the nine the FAF Trustees, the ninth Trustee being the elected Institute President, serving ex officio.
The question addressed in this paper is whether the Wheat Study went too far to accord this influential role to the AICPA such that it may have impaired the FASB's appearance of independence from the Institute and from the practicing profession.
During the meeting of the Institute's Council in May 1972, at which the Wheat Study's recommendations were taken up, Richard T. Baker, the managing partner of Ernst & Ernst, one of the Big 8 audit firms, spoke in strong opposition (Zeff 2015, 170-171 ). Baker's argument illustrates the challenge facing the Wheat Study when it provided a way for the AICPA and the practicing profession to feel they were keeping a hand in the standard-setting process, in order to counter just this kind of reaction. Baker said, ''The price the profession is asked to pay for this new structure is too high. The probability of its success is too low. . ..Will the new Board, cut completely free from real world ties, have any better basis for reaching acceptable conclusions?. . .The profession will be putting its complete trust in seven unspecified people who will have no direct affiliation whatever with practice; who, so far as we can know now, will have no better research support than the APB, and who will have no legal or assured professional support.'' 2 Despite Baker's argument-and he was not alone in speaking against immediate adoption of the Wheat recommendations-Council endorsed the recommendations by ''nearly unanimous consent'' and authorized its Board of Directors to implement them as soon as possible (Zeff 2015, 171) . Zeff (2015, 172) stated that, after adopting the Wheat recommendations, ''The Institute lost its control over the standard setter but retained considerable leverage in the appointment of the trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation and therefore indirectly in the appointment of FASB members.'' This observation provides the hypothesis for this paper. The research question is, therefore, how did the Institute actually exercise this leverage during the first eight years, 1972 to 1980, and did it seem to affect the appearance of independence of both bodies from the AICPA and the practicing profession? It is not the purpose of this study to inquire into whether any such leverage led to a lack of independence in fact, which would be exceedingly difficult to demonstrate.
FORMATION OF THE NEW ORGANIZATION
The FAF was incorporated on June 30, 1972 under the State of Delaware's General Corporation Law and qualified as an organization to which tax-deductible donations could be made under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
In October 1972, the FAF issued an exposure draft, setting forth the proposed Certificate of Incorporation, By-Laws, and Rules of Procedure of the FASB, and called a public hearing for December 15 (FAF 1972) .
Following the FAF's public hearing, the following prescriptions were made part of the By-Laws (FAF 1973) , thus implementing the Wheat recommendations:
The AICPA's Board of Directors shall compose the ''electors,'' to select eight of the nine part-time FAF Trustees, having staggered three-year terms, renewable for one term only. The senior elected officer of the AICPA shall be a Trustee ex officio during his term of office. Of the eight elected Trustees, four are to be CPAs in public practice; two shall be, or have extensive experience as, financial executives (one each chosen from short lists provided by the Financial Executives Institute and the National Association of Accountants); one shall be, or have extensive experience as, a financial analyst (chosen from a short list provided by the Financial Analysts Federation); and one shall be, or have extensive experience as, an accounting educator (chosen from a short list provided by the AAA). [paraphrased from the By-Laws] The AICPA's Board of Directors thereupon created a Financial Accounting Foundation Trustee Review Committee, with between five and eight members, to select the eight FAF Trustees. The four organizations listed in the third bullet point, above, together with the AICPA, were designated as the FAF's ''sponsoring organizations.''
Although it was not stated in either the exposure draft or the final By-Laws whether a simple or super majority of the FAF Trustees was required to appoint a person to the FASB, the Wheat Study had recommended a two-thirds majority, or six out of nine (AICPA 1972, 9, 69) . Its reasoning was apparently that, while the AICPA President plus the four elected CPAs from practice could not alone appoint the Board members, they could at least constitute a bloc against nominations originating with the other four Trustees. But the two-thirds voting stipulation was not carried into the FAF's By-Laws, and it is not known why this Wheat Study recommendation was not respected.
As to the full-time, seven-member FASB, the By-Laws (FAF 1973) specified the following qualifications and terms:
Four members shall be CPAs from public practice or be principally experienced as public practitioners. The remaining three members may or may not be CPAs but are to be persons who are well versed in the problems of financial reporting. The members are to be appointed for five-year staggered terms, renewable for one term only.
All but the first of the foregoing qualifications were in line with the Wheat recommendations. While Wheat had recommended that four members shall be CPAs drawn from public practice, the By-Laws softened this requirement somewhat, saying that they may also be CPAs who were principally experienced as public practitioners. That five of the nine FAF Trustees (including the AICPA's elected President serving ex officio) and four of the seven FASB members were to be drawn from CPAs in public practice, or be principally experienced as public practitioners, implied a continuation of significant influence from the practicing profession. That the AICPA's Board of Directors was to appoint eight of the nine FAF Trustees signified that the Institute was not giving up complete control, or leverage, over the standard-setting process. Yet the final Rules of Procedure of the FASB stipulated that the FASB ''is an independent body created within the private sector to serve an important public interest. '' 3 The By-Laws stated that the Board's pronouncements must secure approval by five of its seven members, again following Wheat. Donald J. Kirk (1990, 109) , one of the charter members of the FASB, later wrote that one of reasons behind the required five-vote majority was ''to mitigate concern that the four Board members with primarily public accounting backgrounds might vote as a bloc.'' Its pronouncements were to be called Statements of Accounting Standards, a name first mentioned in the FAF's 1972 exposure draft (FAF 1972, 23) . The final By-Laws, issued in 1973, modified the name to Statements of Financial Accounting Standards.
The Wheat Study gave the following reason for the qualifications it set for the Board: ''we have intentionally provided that a majority of them would be CPAs drawn from public practice. We think it essential at this time, in the interests of enforcement of the new Standards Board's pronouncements by the public accounting profession, that its composition should not be such as to endanger its acceptability to the profession'' (AICPA 1972, 72) . The members of the Wheat Study knew that if its report were to have effect, it would have to be approved by the AICPA, because since 1939 the accounting standard setter had always been a part-time unit within the Institute, that is, within the organized accounting profession. The establishment of a full-time accounting standard setter in 1972 was without precedent anywhere in the world. John C. Biegler (1983, 6) , the senior partner of the Big 8 audit firm Price Waterhouse & Co., a key member of the Wheat Study and also a member from 1970 to 1974 of the AICPA's Board of Directors, explained as follows:
Not only were these arrangements designed to ensure that there would be continuing involvement by those who had taken the lead in standard setting in the past, but it was hoped that such arrangements would give some comfort and assurance to those in the accounting profession who were deeply troubled by the prospect of the profession giving up complete control of its traditional standard-setting role.
The FASB succeeded the APB on July 1, 1973.
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOUNDATION
The terms of service by the Trustees were set to end on September 30 and begin on October 1, so as to coincide with the AICPA's annual meeting, when its officers were elected. But in 1978, the Trustees' terms were re-set to end on December 31 and begin normally on January 1. The Trustees were to choose their own officers.
When examining those who were appointed to the initial Trustees, one notices the palpable influence of the AICPA. The initial slate, chosen in July 1972, was as follows: 4 Beginning in 1974 Beginning in -1975 , the senior elected AICPA officer was known as Chairman, no longer President. As this is a historical study, the term ''chairman'' will be used, because it was the usage during the period of this study. Of the 30 total members of the Trustees from 1972 to 1980, 22 were AICPA members, of whom 16 were active in the AICPA leadership. Nine were partners in Big 8 audit firms.
In December 1976, a 1,760-page staff study published by a U.S. Senate subcommittee headed by Senator Lee Metcalf (Democrat, Montana), entitled The Accounting Establishment, following an extensive investigation, was strongly critical of the influence exerted on the FASB by the AICPA and by the Big 8 audit firms. The study concluded as follows (U.S. Senate 1976, 15) :
The FASB's organizational separation from the private interest groups sponsoring it is the basis for the claim that it establishes accounting standards ''independently.'' However, the separation is one in name only. This study finds that the ''Big Eight'' accounting firms, the AICPA and, to a lesser extent, the other sponsoring groups have control over the operation of the FASB. Such control is exercised in terms of money, personnel, and organizational support.
The appointment of Alva Way, who was not an AICPA member, as FAF President in January 1978 may well have been precipitated by the criticisms in the Metcalf committee's staff study. The Metcalf criticisms provoked consternation among leaders of the Institute (Olson 1982, 53) and, one supposes, also among the FAF Trustees and FASB Board members.
In the wake of the Metcalf subcommittee's staff study, several accounting researchers conducted empirical studies to see if evidence could be turned up to show that the FASB members from Big 8 firms had, as alleged by the Metcalf subcommittee staff, controlled or even influenced the Board via the formation of coalitions or bloc voting. They could find no such evidence. These empirical studies are discussed in Zeff (2016b, 130) . Moreover, subsequent research studies (Hussein and Ketz 1980; Brown 1981; Newman 1981) have supported the view that the Big 8 audit firms did not dominate the FASB. A further study (Haring 1979, 515) concluded that, while the views of the major audit firms seemed to influence the FASB, it also reached the conclusion, albeit qualified, that ''[a]ccounting firms do not, in general, appear to be dominated by their clients.'' To be sure, some of the data in these studies related to the FASB's standards issued subsequent to 1976, when the Metcalf staff study was published.
In late 1976, the Trustees appointed a Structure Committee chaired by Russell Palmer to perform a comprehensive review of the FAF/FASB organization.
8 One of the reasons given for the appointment of the committee was to respond to the Metcalf criticisms (FAF 1977, 11) . The publication of the Metcalf staff study in December 1976 made it clear to the Structure Committee that major changes in the organization's links with the AICPA and the practicing profession had to be made. Donald Kirk subsequently wrote, commenting on the Wheat Study's design for what he called the ''special relationship'' between the AICPA and the FAF, ''[l]ater events, for example the Metcalf inquiries, have emphasized the need for an arm's-length relationship between the two organizations. . ..Explaining and demonstrating that arm's-length relationship between the two is another continuing challenge to insure independence of the FASB'' (Kirk 1983, 16) .
One of the recommendations in the report of the Trustees' Structure Committee (FAF 1977) , which was issued in April 1977, was that the Trustees were no longer to be appointed by the AICPA's Board of Directors. Instead, the six sponsoring organizations were each to name a member to the Foundation, and this panel would become the ''electors'' of the Trustees, as defined in the By-Laws. It would elect the Trustees from nominations submitted by the very same sponsoring organizations. This important change, which took effect later in 1977, removed the AICPA's authority to appoint the Trustees. The composition of the Trustees was to remain the same: five members from the AICPA (including the elected AICPA Chairman serving ex officio), two from the FEI, and one each from the NAA, the FAF, the AAA, and the SIA. In recommending this change, the Structure Committee said, ''[t]he AICPA's veto was by and large symbolic, and that symbolism is no longer necessary. None of the CPAs we asked felt that the AICPA should retain that veto power'' (FAF 1977, 33) .
Of the 20 FAF Trustees serving between 1972 and 1977 (i.e., while the AICPA's Board of Directors appointed the Trustees), 12 were AICPA members, of whom ten were active in the Institute's leadership. Five of the ten were the elected AICPA President/Chairman, who were Trustees ex officio.
Another of the Structure Committee's recommendations was to enlarge the Trustees to include a member of the banking industry. Accordingly, on January 1, 1979, as noted above, William Dougherty was elected a Trustee-at-large, meaning that he did not represent a sponsoring organization. The Wheat Study's recommendation that the elected AICPA senior officer be made an FAF Trustee ex officio finally came to an end in 1985, when the AICPA's Board of Directors ''formally offered to relinquish the ex officio seat on the Foundation board of trustees,'' and the Trustees ''voted to accept that offer and to make the vacated ex officio seat an at-large trusteeship to be filled by vote of the board of trustees.'' 10 Thus, the stipulated AICPA membership on the Trustees dropped from five to four, but in a board that was growing in total number.
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FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD
The initial membership of the FASB was composed as follows: '' Financial Accounting Foundation Annual Report 1985, p. 5. 11 With the founding in 1984 of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, the number of FAF Trustees increased by three with government backgrounds. In 1985, the total number of FAF Trustees stood at 15. 12 Armstrong's appointment as Chairman became effective on November 1, 1972. 13 Kirk has said that John Biegler, the senior partner in his firm and a member of the FAF Trustees, encouraged him to seek a Board appointment (Kirk 1983, 11) .
Trustees implemented one of their Structure Committee's recommendations, namely, that the Board no longer need be composed by any specified number of CPAs from public practice. The actual number had dropped from four to three by 1979, thus further loosening the link with the practicing profession. The Trustees were henceforth ''to seek the best qualified persons having extensive knowledge of financial accounting and reporting without regard to prior area of activity. '' 18 The next new member of the Board did not join until 1983. Of the Board's charter members, only Kirk and Sprouse remained by 1980. Of the 13 individuals who served on the Board during the 1970s, ten were AICPA members. Six of the ten came from Big 8 audit firms.
All told, nine former members of the APB were appointed to the Trustees or to the Board between 1972 and 1980. Five more former APB members served on the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council-the advisory body to the FASB-during the same period.
While the Wheat Study had said, ''Though the Standards Board will hold public meetings, it must also have the right to meet in executive session'' (AICPA 1972, 74-75) 
CONCLUSIONS
During the period from 1972 to 1980, the pervasive presence of AICPA members and especially the Institute's leaders, past and present, in the membership of the FAF and FASB makes it difficult for an observer not to regard the FAF/FASB organization as virtually a branch operation of the Institute. The initial authority given to the Institute's Board of Directors to appoint eight of the nine FAF Trustees, in addition to the elected senior officer of the Institute serving as a Trustee ex officio, makes it difficult not to use the term ''control'' when characterizing the apparent relationship between the AICPA and the FAF/ FASB organization. Indeed, if one were to use an analogy from accounting standards, when an entity is able appoint virtually all of the directors of a nonprofit institution, it is presumed to have established ''control'' and the two parties would be labeled as parent and subsidiary in a set of consolidated financial statements.
This direction from the Institute was further manifested by the Trustees' decision to name one of its past Presidents as the initial Chairman of the Trustees, Ralph Kent, and another of its past Presidents as the initial Chairman of the FASB, Marshall Armstrong, who served for four and a half and just over six years, respectively. They probably did much to set the tone for the FAF and FASB for years to come. Another manifestation was the Institute's appointment of as many as nine members of its former standard setter, the APB, to the Trustees or the Board, which, according to John Biegler (quoted above), conformed with one of the intentions of the Wheat Study.
In the light of the way in which the AICPA thus used its leverage to appoint the FAF Trustees and indirectly the FASB members, it would be difficult to maintain that the FAF and the FASB in their early years appeared to be independent from the Institute and from the practicing profession.
Mainly, it seems, because of the criticism by the Metcalf subcommittee's staff study in 1976 of significant influence from the Institute and the Big 8 firms in the affairs of the FAF/FASB organization, 21 Senate (1977, 153-154, 339-340, and 347-348) . 20 ''Board Meetings to be Open; Other Changes Are Approved, '' FASB's Status Report No. 50, July 7, 1977 , p. 1. In 1978 , the SEC said the following about the FASB's new open-meetings policy: ''This policy provides that any gathering of a majority of board members is considered a meeting (which must be announced and open to public observation) unless it is clearly of a communicative, administrative or social nature'' (SEC 1978, 269) . 21 For a concurring view, see Miller, Bahnson, and Redding (2016, 33, ftn. 2) .
